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Connaught Battery and the Defence 
of the Atlantic Coast, 1906-1941
Roger Sarty and Bruce Ellis
Status of Halifax Harbour 
Defence in 1906
Connaught Battery, on the shores of Halifax harbour, has virtually 
been ignored by historians despite its 
prominence during a pivotal period 
in Canadian maritime defence.1 
After taking over the fortiﬁcations 
of Halifax from the British army in 
1905-6, when the Imperial armed 
forces withdrew from the Canadian 
coasts, the Dominion government 
built the battery from 1913 to 1916 as 
part of a larger programme to bring 
the fortress up to date. The battery’s 
story bridges the transformation of the 
fortress from a British bastion against 
the United States to a Canadian 
strongpoint that guarded the North 
Atlantic shipping lanes upon which 
Britain’s survival depended during 
the two world wars.2
 A thorough modernization of 
the Halifax fortress had been nearly 
completed when the Imperial troops 
departed, but this happened at a 
time when coast defence practice 
was changing rapidly. Sandwich 
Battery and Fort McNab, whose 
heavy, long-range guns commanded 
the outer harbour, were well placed 
for another full generation of useful 
service, but the same was not true of 
the defences close-in to the city. These 
included electrically controlled anti-
ship mines that in the event of war 
were to be laid in Eastern Passage, the 
channel between Ives Point and Point 
Pleasant and the mouth of the North 
West Arm. To prevent the enemy 
from destroying or running through 
the minefields, a form of attack 
that was likely to come at night, 
there were electric searchlights and 
seven batteries of medium and light 
quick-ﬁring guns at Point Pleasant, 
Georges Island and Ives Point, and 
at Fort Clarence on the Dartmouth 
shore. The Royal Navy, however, 
had never trusted the army’s harbour 
mines, and in 1904-6 succeeded in 
having them abolished. That left 
inner defence exclusively to shore 
batteries at a time when the speed 
and intensity of Japanese destroyer 
and blockship attacks on Port Arthur 
during the Russo-Japanese War 
suggested that quick-ﬁring armament 
should be moved towards the mouths 
of harbours to stop such strikes before 
they reached anchored shipping or 
port facilities.3
Hesitant Steps before the 
First World War
The ofﬁcers of the new Canadian garrison immediately took up 
the problem. By the fall of 1909 the 
staff at Halifax, with assistance from 
British army and naval ofﬁcers, had 
concluded that three 4.7-inch quick-
ﬁre (QF) guns from Georges Island 
and searchlights from Fort Clarence 
should be moved to a new battery near 
Falkland Village, south of Purcells 
Cove. Two other new batteries, at 
York Redoubt and on McNabs Island, 
would receive the guns from Fort 
Clarence and two of the forts at Point 
Pleasant.4 The scheme was tested 
with encouraging results during 1910 
when the Fort Clarence searchlights 
were operated from temporary 
emplacements at Falkland. These 
“dispersed beam” lights projected 
a broad fan of illumination to a 
range of 1,200 to 1,500 yards. In 
conjunction with similar lights at 
Ives Point, they created a brightly 
lit corridor over the shipping lane 
from York Redoubt back through the 
Ives Point–Point Pleasant channel, a 
distance of some two miles. Thus, 
if a sufﬁcient number of guns were 
properly placed, they would have 
a good chance of smashing even a 
determined night attack.5
 Finding money to carry out 
the program was the problem. In 
maintaining the fortress with a 
garrison of over 1,000 regular troops, 
the militia department had already 
stretched its resources at a time 
when the unexpectedly high cost 
to the federal government of new 
transcontinental railways brought 
restrictions on defence spending. The 
department ﬁnally expropriated the 
Falkland site in the spring of 1912, but 
funds for construction there were not 
provided until a year later, and then 
Editor’s note: A sequel to this feature will appear in an upcoming issue of Canadian Military 
History and will explore the legacy of Connaught Battery and its condition today.
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only $24,000 as against the $75,000 
estimated to be the total cost of the 
fort. By early 1914 most of the money 
had been consumed in excavating the 
solid granite site.6
 The staffs in Halifax and Ottawa 
then reconsidered the fortress 
reorganization plan. Over the 
years of discussion it had become 
more elaborate, the projected cost 
of the whole programme rising 
from $167,500 to $200,000.7 Colonel 
(later Major-General Sir) Willoughby 
Gwatkin, a British ofﬁcer on loan to 
the Canadian Militia who had become 
Chief of the General Staff in October 
1913, took the lead in scaling down 
the plan in light of funds and troops 
actually available. He was probably 
also influenced by candid advice 
sent to the Canadian government 
by the British Admiralty that the 
large-scale American attacks that had 
always governed the strength of the 
Halifax defences could no longer be 
contemplated because the expanding 
United States military could now be 
held off only with an enormous effort 
on land and at sea. Quite aside from 
that, the British Empire had been 
pursuing a policy of reconciliation 
with the United States. The real and 
growing danger was of hit-and-run 
raids by German cruisers to disrupt 
North Atlantic shipping, and against 
this form of attack the existing gun 
armament at Halifax was more 
than adequate, although, in some 
cases, poorly placed.8 Gwatkin won 
agreement that as many as ﬁve of 
the inner forts should be abandoned, 
and that none of the planned new 
batteries except Falkland should 
proceed. Undoubtedly the money 
already spent inﬂuenced the decision 
to continue the work at Falkland, but 
defences on the western approaches 
to the inner harbour were urgently 
required even if the steep hills there 
made less than ideal sites for quick-
ﬁring artillery; these guns were most 
effective in sweeping the surface of 
the water from low positions.9
 Despite the renewed commitment 
to build the Falkland battery, work 
ground to a halt in the spring of 1914. 
The government had ﬁnally voted 
$70,000 for the Halifax defences in 
ﬁscal year 1914-15, but these limited 
funds were needed to purchase 
modern searchlight equipment from 
Great Britain.10
The First World War
The outbreak of war between the British Empire and Germany on 4 
August 1914 quickly translated plans 
into action. On 22 August, Militia 
headquarters telegraphed authority 
to Halifax for the expenditure of 
$46,000 on fortiﬁcation construction, 
including $25,000 for Falkland 
battery.11 The governor-general, the 
Duke of Connaught, was closely 
watching developments at Halifax. 
He deeply mistrusted Colonel Sam 
Hughes, the Minister of Militia, 
and was especially critical of the 
Dumping granite ﬁll on the harbourward face of Connaught Battery from the light 
rail system that assisted construction. This photo was likely taken in early 1916.
Workmen mount a 4.7-inch Quick-Fire gun at 
Connaught Battery in early 1916.
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to build the Falkland battery, work 
ground to a halt in the spring of 1914. 
The government had ﬁnally voted 
$70,000 for the Halifax defences in 
ﬁscal year 1914-15, but these limited 
funds were needed to purchase 
modern searchlight equipment from 
Great Britain.10
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August 1914 quickly translated plans 
into action. On 22 August, Militia 
headquarters telegraphed authority 
to Halifax for the expenditure of 
$46,000 on fortiﬁcation construction, 
including $25,000 for Falkland 
battery.11 The governor-general, the 
Duke of Connaught, was closely 
watching developments at Halifax. 
He deeply mistrusted Colonel Sam 
Hughes, the Minister of Militia, 
and was especially critical of the 
Workmen mount a 4.7-inch Quick-Fire gun at 
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latter’s failure to give the fortress a 
higher priority before the outbreak 
of war. Rear Admiral R.S. Phipps 
Hornby, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Royal Navy’s North America and 
West Indies Station, was also very 
concerned about the situation. When 
in mid-September Gwatkin began 
to reduce the garrison mobilized 
at Halifax in response to the Royal 
Above: A workman carries timbers along the construction trolleyway in front of one of the 4.7-inch guns.
Below: A view from Connaught Battery looking out over Halifax Harbour.
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This air photo, taken in June 1944, shows Connaught Battery from the rear of the position. 
Note the anti-submarine nets in the top right corner of the photograph. By the Second World 
War the original guns had been replaced with dummy guns meant to deceive the enemy.
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latter’s failure to give the fortress a 
higher priority before the outbreak 
of war. Rear Admiral R.S. Phipps 
Hornby, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Royal Navy’s North America and 
West Indies Station, was also very 
concerned about the situation. When 
in mid-September Gwatkin began 
to reduce the garrison mobilized 
at Halifax in response to the Royal 
Navy’s success in securing the North 
Atlantic shipping lanes, Hornby 
had the Admiralty make a strong 
protest to the Canadian government: 
“…Halifax is an essential base for 
British cruisers protecting trade to 
and from Canada and the reduction 
ordered effects the safety of the base 
considerably.” Although Gwatkin 
cancelled the troop withdrawals, the 
Duke of Connaught asked Hornby 
to make a special report on Halifax. 
The Admiral, who feared a desperate 
rush by German warships on the 
port, particularly if the war began 
to go badly for the Central Powers, 
urged that Falkland battery should 
be rapidly completed.12
 The Falkland position had not 
been chosen with ease of construction 
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in mind. Water transportation was 
the only practicable form of access, 
necessitating the construction of a 
pier at a cost of at least $10,000, and 
the erection of a cable car on large 
wooden towers to lift heavy loads to 
the top of the 160-foot hill at a further 
cost of over $3,000. Materials were 
moved over the rugged ground of the 
site in carts on a light rail system.13 
Although these arrangements were 
not completed until June 1915, there 
had been considerable progress in 
the construction of the battery by that 
time. The massive concrete platforms 
to which the gun mountings were 
to be bolted had been poured, and 
equipment was already being installed 
in the buildings for the searchlights. 
To save time, only the foundation of 
the electrical generating station (the 
“engine room”), and the structure of 
the associated oil storage building 
were built in concrete; both can still 
be seen in the clearing immediately 
to the north of the main battery site. 
The rest of the work, including the 
searchlight emplacement on the 
foreshore below the hill, was in wood. 
One 10 September 1915, a detachment 
of approximately 50 engineer troops 
began to operate the three lights 
at Falkland.14 Two months later, 
the governor-general showed his 
continued interest in the fort by 
allowing it to be named Connaught 
Battery.15
Henry Eugene McKeen and 
Connaught Battery
In peacetime a large project such as the construction of Connaught 
Battery would be overseen by the 
most senior Royal Canadian Engineer 
officer in the Maritime provinces. 
The immense volume of wartime 
work, however, meant the job fell to a 
junior ofﬁcer. Henry Eugene McKeen, 
of Woodstock, New Brunswick, was 
a 24-year-old provisional lieutenant 
in the 1st (Brighton) Field Company, 
Canadian Engineers, a unit of the part-
time militia, when he came to Halifax 
late in 1914 for active service with 
the Royal Canadian Engineers of the 
Permanent Force. Although McKeen 
had had little military training or 
experience, he was a practicing civil 
engineer, having graduated from 
the University of New Brunswick in 
1910. As Divisional Ofﬁcer 3, he was 
in charge of construction services 
for the seaward defences and was 
responsible for 500 civilian workers. 
Connaught Battery was merely the 
biggest of the several projects under 
his supersivion.16
 McKeen faced an enormous task 
in completing the gun positions. 
The design, probably adapted from 
standard British drawings, combined 
the three emplacements, with their 
associated magazines and crew 
shelters, into a large reinforced 
concrete structure 90 yards long and 
20 yards wide. The entire position 
had to be excavated in granite; once 
the concrete work was complete, the 
seaward face was covered with 17,000 
cubic yards of broken stone and 
the slope of the hill was contoured 
to better protect the site. Further 
excavations were made to the rear of 
the gun positions to create a sheltered 
site for the artillery detachment’s 
wooden barracks.17
 Wartime conditions created 
special problems. Congestion on 
the railways, and the navy’s closure 
of the port during periodic alarms 
whenever the possibility of an attack 
was conceived delayed shipments 
from distant suppliers and, in the 
latter case, held up the transportation 
of material and shifts of workers 
from the Halifax waterfront to the 
battery. Some crucial materials were 
simply not available. Sand was in 
such short supply that workers had 
to scrape up the thin topsoil from 
surrounding areas to provide ﬁll for 
the protective slope in front of the 
Connaught Battery showing two of the three 4.7-inch Quick-Fire guns in the summer of 1916.
CFJIC RE 84-175
battery. During the winter of 1915-16 
construction continued around the 
clock, but the severe weather caused 
a high rate of absenteeism among the 
200 labourers who normally worked 
at the site. The military was not 
pleased with the quality of the work 
force. “Owing to the enlistment of 
the better class of English-speaking 
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 McKeen faced an enormous task 
in completing the gun positions. 
The design, probably adapted from 
standard British drawings, combined 
the three emplacements, with their 
associated magazines and crew 
shelters, into a large reinforced 
concrete structure 90 yards long and 
20 yards wide. The entire position 
had to be excavated in granite; once 
the concrete work was complete, the 
seaward face was covered with 17,000 
cubic yards of broken stone and 
the slope of the hill was contoured 
to better protect the site. Further 
excavations were made to the rear of 
the gun positions to create a sheltered 
site for the artillery detachment’s 
wooden barracks.17
 Wartime conditions created 
special problems. Congestion on 
the railways, and the navy’s closure 
of the port during periodic alarms 
whenever the possibility of an attack 
was conceived delayed shipments 
from distant suppliers and, in the 
latter case, held up the transportation 
of material and shifts of workers 
from the Halifax waterfront to the 
battery. Some crucial materials were 
simply not available. Sand was in 
such short supply that workers had 
to scrape up the thin topsoil from 
surrounding areas to provide ﬁll for 
the protective slope in front of the 
battery. During the winter of 1915-16 
construction continued around the 
clock, but the severe weather caused 
a high rate of absenteeism among the 
200 labourers who normally worked 
at the site. The military was not 
pleased with the quality of the work 
force. “Owing to the enlistment of 
the better class of English-speaking 
labourers,” complained Major-
General Thomas Benson, General 
Ofﬁcer Commanding in the Maritime 
Provinces, “it has been necessary to 
employ foreign labour to a larger 
extent than is desirable, as they can 
only be used to the best advantage 
at digging, mucking, etc, and owing 
to their numerous holidays.” The 80 
Russians employed on the project, for 
example, disappeared for three days 
in January 1916 to celebrate the old 
and new style Russian Christmas.18
 These frustrations told heavily 
on McKeen. By the spring of 1916, 
he was on the edge of physical 
and nervous collapse, so much 
so that he was given two months 
Another aerial view of Connaught battery, taken in June 1944, looking over Purcells Cove and into the 
Northwest Arm. Halifax is on the right of the Arm. The barracks, engine room and other support facilities for 
the searchlights are immediately north (above) the main battery.
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medical leave. Showing a certain 
bureaucratic naivete, McKeen had 
concentrated his waning energy on 
supervising work at the site and had 
failed to keep the ﬁnancial records 
up to date. When in May he was 
offered a posting to an overseas unit, 
Major-General Benson had to cancel 
the appointment as McKeen was 
required in Halifax to verify the large 
number of unaccounted bills that were 
ﬂowing into fortress headquarters. 
Soon after, a letter arrived from 
Militia headquarters which reported 
the Duke of Connaught’s impatience 
with the slow construction, and 
strongly criticized the delays and 
soaring costs. Since 1913 nearly 
$250,000 had been spent, over three 
times the highest prewar estimate. 
Happy to say, Benson ﬁrmly rejected 
the censure and instead commended 
McKeen’s work. He was justiﬁed in 
doing so, as wartime inﬂation and the 
heavy expense of winter construction 
had similarly escalated the costs of 
other projects in Halifax.19
Connaught Battery Becomes 
Operational
During the  c lash  over  the ledgerbooks, the battery was 
being readied for operations. The 
components of the guns – three 4.7-
inch QF, two of which had originally 
been mounted in Fort Clarence, 
and one in Fort Charlotte – were 
delivered to the site in January 1916. 
These weapons fired a 45-pound 
projectile at a rate of 12 rounds 
per minute to an effective range 
of about 8,000 yards. The 70-man 
artillery garrison was provided by 
the 1st (Halifax) Regiment, Canadian 
Garrison Artillery, a militia unit, 
began to arrive in February. Test 
rounds were fired from the guns 
early in August, and later that month 
the Duke of Connaught attended a 
ceremony that ofﬁcially opened the 
battery.20 McKeen was ﬁnally posted 
overseas in September, and served in 
Belgium and France in 1918 before 
returning to Canada and becoming 
the ﬁrst postwar commanding ofﬁcer 
of the 1st (Brighton) Field Company, 
CE, his old militia unit.21
 As things turned out, Connaught 
Battery had been ﬁnished in good 
time. Early in 1915 the Admiralty had 
warned the Canadian government 
A military band leads a procession of troops to garrison Connaught Battery. The wooden tower (right) 
was part of the cable system used to lift loads up to the battery from the pier on the shore.
about the possibility of German 
submarines crossing the Atlantic, but 
the threat took on a new dimension 
when U-53 sank five Allied ships 
off Massachusetts in October of the 
following year. The Germans were 
indeed preparing large submarines 
with an armament of 15 cm guns 
as well as torpedoes and mines for 
distant operations. The Admiralty 
feared that U-boats might run into 
Halifax on the surface at night, and 
therefore the searchlight and quick-
ﬁre gun batteries were of increased 
importance because neither the small 
Canadian patrol vessels available nor 
the Royal Navy’s cruisers on station 
could effectively deal with the “super 
submarines.” Connaught inherited 
further responsibilities when in 
the summer of 1917 the Canadian 
navy installed an anti-submarine 
net between Point Pleasant and Ives 
Point. Shore batteries were essential 
to defeat enemy attempts to break 
throught this barrier. Another danger 
was that powerful enemy surface 
warships might break out of the North 
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per minute to an effective range 
of about 8,000 yards. The 70-man 
artillery garrison was provided by 
the 1st (Halifax) Regiment, Canadian 
Garrison Artillery, a militia unit, 
began to arrive in February. Test 
rounds were fired from the guns 
early in August, and later that month 
the Duke of Connaught attended a 
ceremony that ofﬁcially opened the 
battery.20 McKeen was ﬁnally posted 
overseas in September, and served in 
Belgium and France in 1918 before 
returning to Canada and becoming 
the ﬁrst postwar commanding ofﬁcer 
of the 1st (Brighton) Field Company, 
CE, his old militia unit.21
 As things turned out, Connaught 
Battery had been ﬁnished in good 
time. Early in 1915 the Admiralty had 
warned the Canadian government 
about the possibility of German 
submarines crossing the Atlantic, but 
the threat took on a new dimension 
when U-53 sank five Allied ships 
off Massachusetts in October of the 
following year. The Germans were 
indeed preparing large submarines 
with an armament of 15 cm guns 
as well as torpedoes and mines for 
distant operations. The Admiralty 
feared that U-boats might run into 
Halifax on the surface at night, and 
therefore the searchlight and quick-
ﬁre gun batteries were of increased 
importance because neither the small 
Canadian patrol vessels available nor 
the Royal Navy’s cruisers on station 
could effectively deal with the “super 
submarines.” Connaught inherited 
further responsibilities when in 
the summer of 1917 the Canadian 
navy installed an anti-submarine 
net between Point Pleasant and Ives 
Point. Shore batteries were essential 
to defeat enemy attempts to break 
throught this barrier. Another danger 
was that powerful enemy surface 
warships might break out of the North 
Sea under the cover of foul weather 
and strike at overseas bases before 
British squadrons could respond. The 
reality of the German threat became 
clear in August-September 1918 
when three large U-boats inﬂicted 
substantial losses on shipping in 
Nova Scotia’s coastal waters, and 
laid mines – which fortunately did no 
damage – in the Halifax approaches. 
Connaught, like the other Halifax 
forts, was maintained at a high state 
of readiness until the armistice on 
11 November 1918. The manning 
detachment was withdrawn on 24 
December, leaving only a small 
caretaking detail.22
The Interwar Years
During the interwar years, 1919-1939, the fortress became a 
backwater. Governments bent on 
costcutting slashed defence spending, 
and Militia headquarters gave mobile 
ﬁeld units priority over the garrisons 
on the coasts. Connaught Batttery 
did, however, attract a large share 
of the limited funds available for 
fortiﬁcation construction. In 1924-25, 
the wooden searchlight emplacements 
on the shore and the temporary 
battery command post immediately 
to the north of the gun emplacements 
were replaced by concrete buildings. 
The searchlights were run regularly 
for maintenance and training, but 
the guns were very seldom ﬁred as 
4.7-inch ammunition was in short 
supply, and the battery was too near 
to the city and the main shipping 
channel for safe shooting.23
Connaught Battery 
De-Activated
The battery’s  service  as  an operational coast fort was in fact 
drawing to a close. In 1931 Major-
General A.G.L. McNaughton, chief of 
the General Staff, ﬁnally laid to rest 
the traditional premise of Canadian 
home defence that preparations could 
be made to meet an invasion from the 
Workman excavate solid granite to make way for the Connaught Battery barracks.
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United States. He immediately applied 
the new policy at Halifax, where three 
forts, including Connaught, were 
struck from the defence scheme. In 
1932 the ammunition was removed 
from the magazines, and the guns 
were designated reserve armament 
available for other ports in the 
Maritimes. The fate of the battery 
was sealed in the mid-1930s when 
the navy decided that in a future 
war the fortress’ antisubmarine net 
would be installed between York 
Redoubt and Maugher’s Beach. New 
quick-ﬁring batteries would have to 
be built ahead of this line. In 1938, 
when preparations began to defend 
the Maritimes in the event of a war 
in Europe, the battery’s guns were 
removed.24
 Connaught Battery nevertheless 
played a significant role in the 
defence of Halifax during the 
Second World War. Because of 
delays in the provision of modern 
searchlights, the battery’s lights were 
fully manned and operational from 
26 August 1939 until the spring of 
1941. In the meantime, the main part 
of the fort was used as temporary 
accommodation for artillery units. 
Late in 1941 the whole site became the 
camp for 2nd Fortress (Electrical and 
Mechanical) Company, RCE, which 
was responsible for construction 
and works maintenance services in 
the fortress. For a few years after 
the war, buildings at the battery 
were used as quarters for married 
military personnel. All of the wooden 
barracks were declared surplus and 
dismantled in 1952-53.25 Thereafter 
scrapmetal scroungers stripped 
the fortiﬁcations of all steel ﬁttings 
and did a good deal of damage. 
Residents of the surrounding areas 
also covered the site with dozens of 
car wrecks. In 1971 the provincial 
government purchased the fort from 
Crown Assets26 and removed the 
“automotive decorations.”
Conclusion
Connaught Battery is well worth preserving. Its design is unique 
among the coast artillery sites that 
survive in Canada. It is the only site 
which features such extensive concrete 
works within a single structure. 
It was also the most important 
permanent fortiﬁcation undertaken 
by the Dominion government prior 
to the late 1930s, representing, like 
the founding of the Royal Canadian 
Navy in 1910, Canada’s assumption 
of the responsibility for the defence 
of its own shores.
Notes
A version of this article was originally 
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